ARE THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS GENUINE EXPERIMENTS?
Authors
-
Guadalupe Mettini
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4271-6616
Abstract
It has been argued that thought experiments are sufficiently similar to real experiments to claim that they constitute the same kind of practice, even though the lack of intervention in the material world deprives thought experiments their main source of objective knowledge. In this paper, I attempt to delineate the scope of this interpretation. I argue that perspectives that assert the equivalence of thought and real experimentation often use inappropriate analogies and fail to examine the specific characteristics of scientific experimentation. I argue that while these comparisons fall short, there are aspects in which thought experiments and real experiments share significant similarities that merit careful examination. To support this argument, I analyze a thought experiment proposed by Richard Feynman in 1965. I show that this experiment relies on a set of essential experimental skills developed through scientific training, relies on theoretical knowledge, and involves the ability to reconstruct causal chains.Keywords:
observation, experimentation, material intervention, theoretical knowledge, causal chains.References
Bach, R., Pope, D., Hwang, L., y Batelaan, H. (2013). Controlled Double-slit Electron Diffraction. New Journal of Physics, 15, 033018. https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/15/3/033018
Bishop, M. (1999). Why Thought Experiments Are Not Arguments. Philosophy of Science, 66(4), 534-541. https://www.jstor.org/stable/188748
Bogen, J., y Woodward, J. (1988). Saving the phenomena. Philosophical Review, 97(3), 303-352. https://doi.org/10.2307/2185445
Bricmont, J. (2016). Making Sense of Quantum Mechanics. Springer.
Brown, H. (1987). Observation and Objectivity. Oxford UP.
Brown, J. (1994). Smoke and Mirrors: How science reflects reality. Routledge.
___. (2008). Philosophy of Mathematics: A contemporary introduction to the world of proofs and pictures. Routledge.
___. (2011). The Laboratory of the Mind: Thought experiments in the natural sciences (2ª ed.). Routledge.
Churchland, P. (1979). Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge UP.
___. (1988). Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality: A Reply to Jerry Fodor. Philosophy of Science, 55(2), 167-187.
Collins, H. (1992). Changing order: Replication and induction in scientific practice (2ª ed.). The University of Chicago Press.
Daston, L. (2008). On Scientific Observation. Isis, 99(2), 97-110. https://doi.org/10.1086/588627
Feynman, R., Leighton, R., y Sands, M. (1965). The Feynman Lectures on Physics (Vol. III). Addison-Wesley. https://www.feynmanlectures.caltech.edu/III_01.html#Ch1-F4
Franklin, A. (1984). The Epistemology of Experiments. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 35(4), 381-401. https://www.jstor.org/stable/687342
___. (2002). Física y experimentación. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia, 17(2), 221-242. https://addi.ehu.es/bitstream/handle/10810/40377/Theoria%2044%20221-242.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
Fodor, J. (1984). Observation Reconsidered. Philosophy of Science, 51, 23-43. https://www.jstor.org/stable/187729
Galilei, G. [1638] (1947). Two New Sciences. Trad. S. Drake. University of Wisconsin Press.
Gooding, D. (1992). Putting Agency Back into Experiment. En A. Pickering (Ed.), Science as practice and culture (pp. 65-112). The University of Chicago Press.
Hacking, I. (1982). Experimentation and Scientific Realism. Philosophical Topics, 13(1), 71-87. https://www.pdcnet.org/philtopics/content/philtopics_1982_0013_0001_0071_0087
___. (1983). Representing and Intervening. Cambridge UP.
___. (1988). Philosophers of Experiment. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 2, 147-156. https://www.jstor.org/stable/192879
___. (1992a). The Self-vindication of the Laboratory Sciences. En A. Pickering (Ed.), Science as practice and culture (pp. 29-64). The University of Chicago Press.
___. (1992b). Do Thought Experiments Have a Life of Their own? Comments on James Brown, Nancy Nersessian and David Gooding. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 2, 302-308. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0270864700009383
Häggqvist, S. (2009). A Model for Thought Experiments. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 39, 55-76. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27822036
Hanson, N. (1958). Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Science. Cambridge UP.
Hesse, M. B. (1963). Models and Analogies in Science. University of Notre Dame Press.
Kosso, P. (1989). Observability and Observation in Physical Science. Kluwer.
Kuhn, T. [1962] (2004). La estructura de las revoluciones científicas. FCE.
Mach, E. [1897] (1973) “On Thought Experiments”. Trad. O. Price y Krilmsky. Philosophical Forum, 4-3, pp. 446-457.
Malik, S. (2017). Observation Versus Experiment: An Adequate Framework for Analysing Scientific Experimentation? Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie, 48(1), 71-95. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-016-9340-1
Norton, J. (2004). Why Thought Experiments Do not Transcend Empiricism. En Hitchcock, C. (ed.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Science (pp. 44-66). Blackwell.
Radder, H. (2006). The World Observed/The World Conceived. University of Pittsburgh Press.
Shapere, D. (1982). El concepto de observación en ciencia y en filosofía. En L. Olivé & y A.R. Pérez Ransanz (Eds.), Filosofía de la ciencia: teoría y observación (pp. 479-526). Siglo XXI.
Shinod, N. K. (2017). Why Thought Experiments Do Have a Life of Their Own: Defending the Autonomy of Thought Experimentation Method. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 34, 75-98. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-016-0077-3
Sorensen, R. (1992). Thought Experiments. Oxford UP.
Steinle, F. (1997). Entering New Fields: Exploratory Uses of Experimentation. Philosophy of Science, 64(4), S65-S74. https://doi.org/10.1086/392611.
Tonomura, A., Endo, J., Matsuda, T., Kawasaki, T., y Ezawa, H. (1989). Demonstration of Single-electron Build up of an Interference Pattern. American Journal of Physics, 57, 117-120. https://doi.org/10.1119/1.16104
Young, T. [1804] (1959). Experimental Demonstration of the General Law of the Interference of Light. En M. Shamos (Ed.), Great experiments in physics (pp. 96-101). Dover.
